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OCI No. 2392/65

**ZENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
Office of Current Intelligence  
3 November 1965

## **Intelligence Memorandum**

Comments on INR Research Memorandum RSB-121:  
"Moscow's Evolving Doctrine for Latin America"

1. We find no quarrel with the memo's primary theme--the current Soviet emphasis on the use of "united front" tactics in Latin America. However, the memo's chief drawback is that it tends to oversimplify Moscow's approach to the diffuse and varied conditions under which various Communist parties operate in Latin America. The conclusion one is tempted to draw is that Soviet policymakers have mapped out a farsighted, long-range program to deal with the question. In essence, however, Moscow's approach is quite pragmatic and highly opportunistic. It is also largely a responsive one. That is to say, far from exercising a major initiative in regard to Latin American Communist parties, the Soviets are essentially reacting to a tactical situation. In sum, prevalent political conditions in Latin America are such that the "united front" tactic simply holds out the promise of more success in more countries than any other course.

2. Another, and perhaps even more important, consideration is that the memo tends to minimize the possibilities of Soviet support for "partisan guerrilla insurgency." Soviet leaders have long recognized--especially since October, 1962--that to embark upon an openly aggressive course such as direct support for rebellion invites a response from the US as well as from the military power structure in Latin America. At the same time, because the USSR's political and economic stake in the continent is relatively small, it stands to lose little by aiding insurgents as long as it does not risk a confrontation with the US. Moscow's aim is to work toward the achievement of significant control over the Latin American left. When Soviet interests are not directly at stake, the USSR may render some support to

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rebel groups as the only alternative to a complete Soviet loss of control and influence over "progressive forces." Such support, however, will in most cases be minimal and Moscow will avoid becoming directly involved.

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OCI - NOTICE OF SPECIAL PAPER

Date

Comments on IIR Research Memorandum ESB-121: \_\_\_\_\_  
: Moscow's Evolving Doctrine for Latin America\*

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SUBJECT

REQUESTED BY : \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE : DCI's Briefing Book for Special Group

DESIRED LENGTH : \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISSEM : Original delivered to [REDACTED] DPP MCS? \_\_\_\_\_ STATINTL  
: Re PD-18

COORDINATION  
OUTSIDE OCI : 1 - SSBA  
: 1 - [REDACTED] DPP STATINTL

ASSIGNED TO : SP/PA STATINTL DUE DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

OAD REVIEW : \_\_\_\_\_

1. O/DCI \_\_\_\_\_ 4. CS/II \_\_\_\_\_ 6. WA \_\_\_\_\_ 7. AA \_\_\_\_\_ 8. SSBA \_\_\_\_\_

2. O/DDI \_\_\_\_\_ 5. DAY/SIDO \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_ P/A \_\_\_\_\_

3. O/ADCI \_\_\_\_\_

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